Robert
Levinson, American Missing In Iran, Was Working For CIA
WASHINGTON- In March 2007, retired FBI agent Robert Levinson flew to Kish Island, an
Iranian resort awash with tourists, smugglers and organized crime figures. Days
later, after an arranged meeting with an admitted killer, he checked out of his
hotel, slipped into a taxi and vanished. For years, the U.S. has publicly
described him as a private citizen who traveled to the tiny Persian Gulf island
on private business.
But that was just a
cover story. An Associated Press investigation reveals that Levinson was
working for the CIA. In an extraordinary breach of the most basic CIA rules, a
team of analysts — with no authority to run spy operations — paid Levinson to
gather intelligence from some of the world's darkest corners. He vanished while
investigating the Iranian government for the U.S.
The CIA was slow to
respond to Levinson's disappearance and spent the first several months denying
any involvement. When Congress eventually discovered what happened, one of the
biggest scandals in recent CIA history erupted.
Behind closed
doors, three veteran analysts were forced out of the agency and seven others
were disciplined. The CIA paid Levinson's family $2.5 million to pre-empt a
revealing lawsuit, and the agency rewrote its rules restricting how analysts
can work with outsiders.
But even after the
White House, FBI and State Department officials learned of Levinson's CIA ties,
the official story remained unchanged.
"He's a
private citizen involved in private business in Iran," the State
Department said in 2007, shortly after Levinson's disappearance.
"Robert
Levinson went missing during a business trip to Kish Island, Iran," the
White House said last month.
Details of the
unusual disappearance were described in documents obtained or reviewed by the
AP, plus interviews over several years with dozens of current and former U.S.
and foreign officials close to the search for Levinson. Nearly all spoke on
condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the
sensitive case.
The AP first
confirmed Levinson's CIA ties in 2010 and continued reporting to uncover more
details. It agreed three times to delay publishing the story because the U.S.
government said it was pursuing promising leads to get him home.
The AP is reporting
the story now because, nearly seven years after his disappearance, those
efforts have repeatedly come up empty. The government has not received any sign
of life in nearly three years. Top U.S. officials, meanwhile, say his captors
almost certainly already know about his CIA association.
There has been no
hint of Levinson's whereabouts since his family received proof-of-life photos
and a video in late 2010 and early 2011. That prompted a hopeful burst of
diplomacy between the United States and Iran, but as time dragged on, promising
leads dried up and the trail went cold.
Some in the U.S.
government believe he is dead. But in the absence of evidence either way, the
government holds out hope that he is alive and the FBI says it remains
committed to bringing him home.
If Levinson remains
alive at age 65, he has been held captive longer than any American, longer than
AP journalist Terry Anderson, who was held more than six years in Beirut.
Unlike Anderson, Levinson's whereabouts and captors remain a mystery.
Today, Iran and
United States tiptoe toward warmer relations and a deal over Iran's nuclear
enrichment. But the U.S. has no new leads about Levinson's whereabouts,
officials said. And Iranian President Hassan Rouhani publicly says he has no
information about Levinson's whereabouts.
Meanwhile, the
story of how the married father of seven children became part of the CIA's spy
war with Iran has been cloaked in secrecy, with no public accounting for the
agency's mistakes.
___
A 28-year veteran
of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the FBI, Robert Levinson had a
natural ability to cultivate informants. Former colleagues say he was an easy
conversationalist who had the patience to draw out people and win their
confidence. He'd talk to anyone.
"Bob, in that
sense, was fearless," said retired FBI Assistant Director Mark Mershon,
who worked with Levinson in Miami in the 1980s. "He wasn't concerned about
being turned down or turned away."
As the Soviet Union
collapsed, Levinson turned his attention away from Mafia bosses and cocaine
cartels and began watching the Russian gangsters who made their homes in
Florida. Russian organized crime was a niche then and Levinson made a name as
one of the few investigators who understood it.
At a Justice
Department organized crime conference in Santa Fe, N.M., in the early 1990s,
Levinson listened to a presentation by a CIA analyst named Anne Jablonski and
spotted a kindred spirit.
Jablonski was
perhaps the government's foremost expert on Russian organized crime. Former
colleagues say she had an encyclopedic memory and could, at the mere mention of
a crime figure, quickly explain his place in the hierarchy and his method of
moving money. When White House officials had questions about Russian organized
crime, they often called Jablonski directly.
In the relatively
staid world of CIA analysts, Jablonski was also a quirky character, a yoga
devotee who made her own cat food, a woman who skipped off to Las Vegas to
renew her vows in an Elvis-themed chapel.
After the Santa Fe
conference, Levinson left a note for Jablonski at her hotel and the two began
exchanging thoughts on organized crime. Jablonski invited Levinson to CIA
headquarters in Langley, Va., to speak to her colleagues in the Office of
Russian and European Analysis.
By the time Levinson
retired from the FBI in 1998, he and Jablonski were close friends. She attended
his going-away party in Florida, met his family and harvested his knowledge of
organized crime.
In retirement,
Levinson worked as a private investigator, traveling the world and gathering
information for corporate clients. Jablonski, meanwhile, thrived at the CIA.
After the Sept. 11 attacks, former colleagues say, she was assigned to brief
Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller about terrorist
threats every morning.
In 2005, Jablonski
moved to the Office of Transnational Issues, the CIA team that tracks threats
across borders. Right away, she arranged for Levinson to speak to the
money-laundering experts in the office's Illicit Finance Group.
In a sixth-floor
CIA conference room, Levinson explained how to track dirty money. Unlike the
analysts in the audience, Levinson came from the field. He generated his own
information.
In June 2006, the
head of Illicit Finance, Tim Sampson, hired Levinson on a contract with the
CIA, former officials said. Like most CIA contracts, it was not a matter of
public record. But it also wasn't classified.
___
At its core, the
CIA is made up of two groups: operatives and analysts. Operatives collect
intelligence and recruit spies. Analysts receive strands of information and
weave them together, making sense of the world for Washington decision-makers.
Their
responsibilities don't overlap. Operatives manage spies. Analysts don't.
Levinson was hired
to work for a team of analysts. His contract, worth about $85,000, called for
him to write reports for the CIA based on his travel and his expertise.
From the onset,
however, he was doing something very different. He wasn't writing scholarly
dissertations on the intricacies of money laundering. He was gathering
intelligence, officials say.
He uncovered
sensitive information about Colombian rebels. He dug up dirt on Venezuela's
mercurial president. He delivered photos and documents on militant groups. And
he met with sources about Iran's nuclear program, according to people who have
reviewed the materials.
Levinson's
production got noticed. The CIA expected he'd provide one or two items a month
from his travels. Some months, former officials said, Levinson would send 20
packages including photos, computer disks and documents — the work of a man
with decades of investigative experience.
Levinson's
arrangement with the CIA was odd.
The agency
instructed him not to mail his packages to headquarters or email documents to
government addresses, former officials said. Instead, he was told to ship his
packages to Jablonski's home in Virginia. If he needed to follow up, he was
instructed to contact Jablonski's personal email account.
Jablonski said the
analysts simply wanted to avoid the CIA's lengthy mail screening process. As an
employee, Jablonski could just drive the documents through the front gate each
morning.
"I didn't
think twice about it," she said in an interview.
But the normal way
to speed up the process is to open a post office box or send packages by FedEx,
officials say. And if Levinson were producing only unclassified analytical
documents, there would have been no reason he couldn't email them to the CIA.
The whole
arrangement was so peculiar that CIA investigators conducting an internal probe
would later conclude it was an effort to keep top CIA officials from figuring
out that the analysts were running a spying operation. Jablonski adamantly
denies that.
What's more, the
Illicit Finance Group didn't follow the typical routine for international
travel. Before someone travels abroad for the agency, the top CIA officer in
the country normally clears it. That way, if a CIA employee is arrested or
creates a diplomatic incident, the agency isn't caught by surprise.
That didn't happen
before Levinson's trips, former officials said. He journeyed to Panama, Turkey
and Canada and was paid upon his return, people familiar with his travels said.
After each trip, he submitted bills and the CIA paid him for the information
and reimbursed him for his travel expenses.
Neither the
analysts nor the contract officers or managers who reviewed the contract, ever
flagged it as a problem that Levinson's travel might become a problem.
It would prove to
be a serious problem.
Levinson was
assigned a contract officer inside the agency, a young analyst named Brian
O'Toole. But Jablonski was always his primary contact. Sometimes, he told her
before he left for a trip. Other times, he didn't. The emails between Jablonski
and Levinson, some of which the AP has seen or obtained, are circumspect. But
they show that Levinson was taking his cues from her.
The more Levinson
did for the agency, the more the analysts ran afoul of the CIA's most basic
rules.
Before anyone can
meet sources, seasoned CIA intelligence officials must review the plan to make
sure the source isn't a double agent. That never happened for Levinson.
Levinson's meetings
blurred the lines between his work as a private investigator and his work as a
government contractor. Inside the CIA, the analysts reasoned that as long as
they didn't specifically assign Levinson to meet someone, they were abiding by
the rules.
On Feb. 5, 2007,
Levinson emailed Jablonski and said he was gathering intelligence on Iranian
corruption. He said he was developing an informant with access to the
government and could arrange a meeting in Dubai or on an island nearby.
Problem was,
Levinson's contract was out of money and, though the CIA was working to
authorize more, it had yet to do so.
"I would like
to know if I do, in fact, expend my own funds to conduct this meeting, there
will be reimbursement sometime in the near future, or, if I should discontinue
this, as well as any and all similar projects until renewal time in May,"
Levinson wrote.
There's no evidence
that Jablonski ever responded to that email. And she says she has no
recollection of ever receiving it.
A few days later,
Levinson joined Jablonski and her husband for dinner at Harry's Tap Room in the
Washington suburbs. Levinson was days away from his trip, and though he was
eager to get paid for it, Jablonski says the subject never came up in
conversation.
The discussion was
more light-hearted, she said. She recalls scolding her overweight friend for
not eating right, especially while on the road. At one point she recalls
chiding him: "If I were your wife, I'd confiscate your passport."
On Feb. 12,
Levinson again emailed Jablonski, saying he hadn't heard anything from the
contract office. Jablonski urged him not to get the contract team involved.
"Probably best
if we keep talk about the additional money among us girls — you, me, Tim and
Brian — and not get the contracts folks involved until they've been officially
notified through channels," Jablonski said, according to emails read to
the AP.
Jablonski signed
off: "Be safe."
Levinson said he
understood. He said he'd try to make this trip as successful as previous ones.
And he promised to "keep a low profile."
"I'll call you
upon my return from across the pond," he said.
While Levinson was
overseas, the CIA was raving about information Levinson had recent sent about
Venezuela and Colombian rebels.
"You hit a
home run out of the park with that stuff," she wrote. "We can't, of
course, task you on anything, but let's just say it's GREAT material."
Levinson arrived in
Dubai on March 3, 2007. Friends and investigators say he was investigating
cigarette smuggling and also looking into Russian organized crime there.
On March 8, he
boarded a short flight to Kish Island, a tourist destination about 11 miles off
Iran's southern coast. Unlike the Dubai trip, this one was solely for the CIA.
He was there to meet his source about Iran.
The biggest prize
would be gleaning something about Iran's nuclear program, one of the CIA's most
important targets.
Levinson's source
on Kish was Dawud Salahuddin, an American fugitive wanted for killing a former
Iranian diplomat in Maryland in 1980. In interviews with ABC News and the New
Yorker, Salahuddin has admitted killing the diplomat
Since fleeing to
Iran, Salahuddin had become close to some in the Iranian government,
particularly to those seen as reformers and moderates.
To set up the
meeting, Levinson worked with a longtime friend, retired NBC investigative
reporter Ira Silverman. Silverman had talked at length with Salahuddin and, in
a 2002 piece for the New Yorker magazine, portrayed him as a potential
intelligence source if the U.S. could coax him out of Iran. The subtitle of the
article: "He's an assassin who fled the country. Could he help Washington
now?"
"I told them
to put off until after the U.S. surge in Iraq was completed," Salahuddin
told the National Security News Service, a Washington news site, shortly after
Levinson disappeared. "But Silverman and Levinson pushed for the meeting
and that's why we met in March."
Silverman's role in
helping set up Levinson's meeting with Salahuddin has been previously
disclosed. Silverman declined to discuss Levinson's disappearance.
Levinson's flight
landed late the morning of March 8, a breezy, cloudy day. He checked into the
Hotel Maryam, a few blocks off Kish's eastern beaches. Salahuddin has said he
met with Levinson for hours in his hotel room.
The hotel's
registry, which Levinson's wife has seen, showed him checking out on March 9,
2007.
___
Jablonski was in
the office when news broke that Levinson had gone missing. She went to the
bathroom and threw up.
FBI agents began
asking about Levinson's disappearance and the CIA started a formal inquiry into
whether anyone at the agency had sent Levinson to Iran or whether he was
working for the CIA at the time.
The response from
the analytical division was that, yes, Levinson had given a few presentations
and had done some analytical work. But his contract was out of money. The
agency had no current relationship with Levinson and there was no connection to
Iran.
That's what the CIA
told the FBI and Congress, according to numerous current and former FBI, CIA
and congressional officials.
Jablonski never
mentioned to internal investigators the many emails she'd traded with Levinson,
officials close to the investigation said. When asked, she said she had no idea
he was heading to Iran. She didn't tell managers or that Levinson expected to
be reimbursed for the trip he was on, or that he was investigating Iranian
corruption.
Jablonski says none
of this was a secret; Levinson's contract and work product were available to
others at the CIA, she said.
Because the emails
were exchanged from her personal account, they were not available to
investigators searching the CIA's computers. But had anyone at the CIA or FBI
conducted even a cursory examination of Levinson's work product, it would have
been immediately clear that Levinson was not acting as a mere analyst.
Had anyone read his
invoices, people who have seen or been briefed on them said, investigators
would have seen handwritten bills mentioning Iran and its Revolutionary Guard.
That didn't happen.
So the official
story became that Levinson was in Iran on private business, either to
investigate cigarette smuggling or to work on a book about Russian organized
crime, which has a presence on Kish.
At the State
Department, officials told the world that Levinson was a private businessman.
"At the time
of his disappearance Mr. Levinson was not working for the United States
government," the State Department said in a May 2007 message sent to
embassies worldwide and signed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
Levinson's family
feared the government had forsaken him.
The government's
version would have remained the official story if not for Levinson's friends.
One of them was David McGee, a former Justice Department prosecutor in Florida
who had worked with Levinson when he was at the FBI. McGee, now in private practice
at the Florida law firm Beggs and Lane, knew that Levinson was working for the
CIA. He just couldn't prove it.
As time dragged on,
McGee kept digging. Finally, he and his paralegal, Sonya Dobbs, discovered
Levinson's emails with Jablonski.
They were
astounded. And they finally had the proof they needed to get the government's
attention.
Armed with the
emails, McGee wrote to the Senate Intelligence Committee in October 2007. The
CIA had indeed been involved in Levinson's trip, the letter proved.
The CIA had been
caught telling Congress a story that was flatly untrue. The Intelligence
Committee was furious. In particular, Levinson's senator, Bill Nelson, D-Fla.,
took a personal interest in the case. The committee controls the budget of the
CIA, and one angry senator there can mean months of headaches for the agency.
CIA managers said
their own employees had lied to them. They blamed the analysts for not coming
forward sooner. But the evidence had been hiding in plain sight. The CIA didn't
conduct a thorough investigation until the Senate got involved. By then,
Levinson had been missing for more than eight months. Precious time had been
lost.
Sampson said he was
never aware of Levinson's emails with Jablonski or the Iranian trip.
"I didn't even
know he was working on Iran," he said. "As far as I knew he was a
Latin America, money-laundering and Russian organized crime guy. I would never
have directed him to do that."
Finally, the CIA
assigned its internal security team to investigate. That inquiry quickly
determined that the agency was responsible for Levinson while he was in Iran,
according to a former official familiar with the review. That was an important
conclusion. It meant that, whatever happened to Levinson overseas, the CIA bore
responsibility.
Next, a team of
counterintelligence officers began unraveling the case.
The investigation
renewed some longtime tensions between the CIA's operatives and analysts. The
investigators felt the analysts had been running their own amateur spy
operation, with disastrous results. Worse, they said the analysts withheld what
they knew, allowing senior managers to testify falsely on Capitol Hill.
That led the
Justice Department to investigate possible criminal charges against Jablonski
and Sampson. Charges were never pursued, current and former officials said, in
part because a criminal case could have revealed the whole story behind
Levinson's disappearance. Officially, though, the investigation remains open.
Sampson offered to
take a polygraph. Jablonski says she has consistently told the truth. Recently,
as the five-year statute of limitations concluded, FBI agents interviewed her
again and she told the same story, officials said.
The analysts argued
that many people had seen Levinson's contract and his work product. Nobody
questioned it until he went missing, they said. The way the analysts saw it,
the CIA was looking for scapegoats.
"That she
would even by accident put someone in harm's way is laughable," said
Margaret Henoch, a former CIA officer and a close friend of Jablonski.
"When I worked with Anne, and I worked very closely with her for a very
long time, she was always the one who pulled me up short and made me follow
procedure."
Jablonski said the
CIA's relationship with Levinson was not unusual. But as part of the
investigation, the CIA reviewed every analytical contract it had.
Only Levinson was
meeting with sources, collecting information, and getting reimbursed for his
trips, officials said. Only Levinson was mailing packages of raw information to
the home of an analyst.
Despite Jablonski's
denials, her emails convinced investigators that she knew Levinson was heading
overseas and, with a wink and a nod, made it clear he could expect to be paid.
In May 2008,
Jablonski was escorted from the building and put on administrative leave.
Sampson was next. At the CIA, when you're shown the door, you leave with
nothing. Security officers empty your desk, scrutinize its contents and mail
you whatever doesn't belong to the agency.
Both were given the
option of resigning or being fired. The next month, they resigned. Their boss
was forced into retirement. At least seven others were disciplined, including
employees of the contracts office that should have noticed that Levinson's
invoices didn't square with his contract.
In secret Senate
hearings from late 2007 through early 2008, CIA Deputy Director Stephen Kappes
acknowledged that the agency had been involved in Levinson's disappearance and
conceded that it hadn't been as forthcoming as it should have been, current and
former officials said.
The CIA's top
lawyer, John Rizzo, had to explain it all to the White House. Former Bush
administration officials recall Rizzo meeting with a stunned Fred Fielding, the
White House counsel who asked, since when do CIA analysts get involved in
operations?
One of Rizzo's
assistants, Joseph Sweeney, a lawyer, flew to Florida to apologize to
Levinson's family.
The CIA paid the
family about $120,000, the value of the new contract the CIA was preparing for
him when he left for Iran. The government also gave the family a $2.5 million
annuity, which provides tax-free income, multiple people briefed on the deal
said. Neither side wanted a lawsuit that would air the secret details in
public.
Jablonski now
analyzes risk for companies doing business overseas.
Sampson, the former
head of CIA's Illicit Finance group, quickly returned to the government,
landing a job at the Department of Homeland Security's intelligence division.
O'Toole, the young contracts officer, moved to the Treasury Department. He
would not comment.
Inside the CIA, the
biggest legacy of the Levinson case might be the strict new rules in place for
analysts. Before, analysts were encouraged to build relationships with experts.
An analyst could go to dinner with a professor of Middle East affairs or pick
up the phone and chat with a foreign affairs expert. The 9/11 Commission
encouraged CIA analysts to do even more to solicit outside views.
After the Levinson
inquiry, the CIA handed down orders requiring analysts to seek approval for
nearly any conversation with outsiders. The rules were intended to prevent
another debacle like Levinson's, but former officials say they also chilled
efforts to bring outside views into the CIA.
___
The U.S. always
suspected, but could never prove, that Levinson had been picked up by Iranian
security forces. What was not immediately clear, however, was whether Iran knew
that Levinson was working for the CIA.
Now, nearly than
seven years later, investigators believe Iranian authorities must know.
Levinson wasn't trained to resist interrogation. U.S. officials could not
imagine him withholding information from Iranian interrogators, who have been
accused of the worst types of mental and physical abuses.
In an October 2010
interview with the AP, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president of Iran at the time,
said his country was willing to help find Levinson. But he appeared to suggest
he knew or had suspicions that Levinson was working for the U.S. government.
"Of course if
it becomes clear what his goal was, or if he was indeed on a mission, then
perhaps specific assistance can be given," Ahmadinejad said. "For
example, if he had plans to visit with a group or an individual or go to
another country, he would be easier to trace in that instance."
As a CIA
contractor, Levinson would have been a valuable chip to bargain with on the
world stage. So if Iran had captured him, and knew his CIA ties, why the
secrecy?
That question
became even more confusing in 2009, when three U.S. hikers strayed across
border from Iraq into Iran and were arrested. If Iran had captured Levinson,
investigators wondered, why would it publicly accuse three hikers of espionage
while keeping quiet about an actual CIA contractor?
Occasionally,
Iranian defectors would claim to have seen Levinson or to have heard where he
was being held, according to his family, former officials and State Department
cables published by WikiLeaks.
A French doctor
said Levinson was treated at his hospital in Tehran. An Iranian nurse claimed
to have attended to him. One defector said he saw Levinson's name scrawled into
a prison door frame. Someone sent Levinson's family what appeared to be secret
Iranian court documents with his name on them.
But the U.S. could
never confirm any of these accounts or corroborate the documents.
Occasionally, the
family would hear from someone claiming to be the captor. Once, someone sent an
email not only to the family, but also to other addresses that might have been
stored on Levinson's phone. But despite efforts to try to start negotiating,
the sender went silent.
The State
Department continued its calls on Iran to release information about Levinson's
whereabouts. Then, in November 2010, Levinson's wife Christine received an
email from an unknown address. A file was attached, but it would not open.
Frantic, she sent
the email to some computer savvy friends, who opened the file and held the
phone to the computer. Christine Levinson immediately recognized her husband's
voice.
"My beautiful,
my loving, my loyal wife, Christine," he began.
The 54-second video
showed Levinson sitting in front of a concrete wall, looking haggard but
unharmed. He said he was running dangerously low of diabetes medicine, and he
pleaded with the government to bring him home.
"Thirty-three
years of service to the United States deserves something," Levinson said.
"Please help me."
The video was a
startling proof of life and it ignited the first promising round of diplomacy since
Levinson's disappearance. U.S. officials met privately with members of the
Iranian government to discuss the case. The Iranians still denied any knowledge
of Levinson's whereabouts but said they were willing to help, U.S. officials
said.
Some details about
the video didn't add up, though. The email had been sent from a cyber cafe in
Pakistan, officials said, and Pashtun wedding music played faintly in the
background. The Pashtun people live primarily in Pakistan and Afghanistan, just
across Iran's eastern border.
Further, the video
was accompanied by a demand that the U.S. release prisoners. But officials said
the United States was not holding anyone matching the names on the list.
In March 2011,
after months of trying to negotiate with shadows, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton released a statement saying the U.S. had evidence that Levinson was
being held "somewhere in southwest Asia." The implication was that
Levinson might be in the hands of terrorist group or criminal organization
somewhere in Pakistan or Afghanistan, not necessarily in Iran.
U.S. intelligence
officials working the case still believed Iran was behind Levinson's
disappearance, but they hoped Clinton's statement would offer a plausible
alternative story if Iran wanted to release him without acknowledging it ever
held him.
U.S. negotiators
didn't care what the story was, as long as it ended with Levinson coming home.
The following
month, the family received another email, this time from a new address, one
that tracked back to Afghanistan. Photos were attached. Levinson looked far
worse. His hair and beard were long and white. He wore an orange Guantanamo
Bay-style jumpsuit. A chain around his neck held a sign in front of his face.
Each picture bore a different message.
"Why you can
not help me," was one.
Though the photos
were disturbing, the U.S. government and Levinson's family saw them as a
hopeful sign that whoever was holding Levinson was interested in making a deal.
Then, a surprising thing happened.
Nothing.
Nobody is sure why
the contact stopped. Some believe that, if Iran held him, all the government
wanted was for the United States to tell the world that Levinson might not be
in Iran after all. Others believe Levinson died.
Iran executes
hundreds of prisoners each year, human rights groups say. Many others disappear
and are presumed dead. With Levinson's history of diabetes and high blood
pressure, it was also possible he died under questioning.
The discussions
with Iran ended. A task force of CIA, FBI and State Department officials
studied the case anew. Analysts considered alternative theories. Maybe Levinson
was captured by Russian organized crime figures, smugglers or terrorists? They
investigated connections between Russian and Iranian oil interests.
But each time, they
came back to Iran.
For example, during
one meeting between the U.S. and Iran, the Iranians said they were searching
for Levinson and were conducting raids in Baluchistan, a mountainous region
that includes parts of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, U.S. officials said. But
the U.S. ultimately concluded that there were no raids, and officials
determined that the episode was a ruse by the Iranians to learn how U.S.
intelligence agencies work.
Then, U.S.
operatives in Afghanistan traced the hostage photos to a cellphone used to
transmit them, officials said. They even tracked down the owner, but concluded
he had nothing to do with sending them.
Such abrupt dead
ends were indicative of a professional intelligence operation, the U.S.
concluded. Whoever sent the photos and videos had made no mistakes. Mobsters
and terrorists are seldom so careful.
Iran denies any
knowledge of Levinson's whereabouts and says it's doing all it can.
This past June,
Iran elected Hassan Rouhani as president. He has struck a more moderate tone
than his predecessor, sparking hope for warmer relations between Iran and the
West. But Rouhani's statements on Levinson were consistent with Ahmadinejad's.
"He is an
American who has disappeared," Rouhani told CNN in September. "We
have no news of him. We do not know where he is."
___
Back home in
Florida, Christine Levinson works to keep her husband's name in the news and
pushes the Obama Administration to do more. Last year, the FBI offered a reward
of $1 million for information leading to the return of her husband. But the
money hasn't worked.
In their big,
tight-knit family, Bob Levinson has missed many birthdays, weddings,
anniversaries and grandchildren.
Levinson was always
the breadwinner, the politically savvy investigator who understood national
security. Now it is his wife who has traveled to Iran seeking information on
her husband, who has meetings on Capitol Hill or with White House officials.
They are kind and reassuring.
But nothing
changes.
Others held in Iran
have returned home. Not her husband.
"There isn't
any pressure on Iran to resolve this," she said in January, frustrated
with what she said was a lack of attention by Washington. "It's been much
too long."

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